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Government debt crises versus balance of payments
crises 
It must be assumed that Greece’s public sector has
become insolvent: existing government debt exceeds
the present value of achievable primary surpluses of
future government budgets. Prior to the EU Summit
of 26 October 2011, the European Commission esti-
mated that the Greek general government’s consoli-
dated gross debt would stand at 162.8 percent of
Greek GDP by the end of 2011, and would further
increase to 198.5 percent by the end of 2013. These
figures reflect 20 years of government borrowing of
around 7.5 percent of GDP on average for the years
from 1991 to 1999 and an almost unchanged average
of 7.4 percent between 2000 and 2010. The lowest
level of Greek government borrowing was achieved in
1999, at 3.1 percent of GDP, and the peak figure was
reached ten years later in 2009, at 15.8 percent of
GDP. Factoring in the austerity packages that came
along with the 2010 bail-out, the Commission esti-
mates that the Greek general government will still
have to borrow 8.9 percent, 7 percent and 6.8 percent
of Greek GDP, respectively in the years 2011, 2012
and 2013.1
During the 1990s, the borrowing needs of the Greek
government could be met by net lending by the Greek
private sector, which averaged at 10.8 percent of GDP
between 1991 and 1999. Over the past decade this
changed dramatically when the average annual net
lending position of the private sector shrank to a mere
1.5 percent of GDP.2 The outcome was an accumula-
tion of net foreign debt which stood at 98.2 percent of
Greek GDP at the end of 2010.3 Accumulation of for-
eign debt does not necessarily mean a balance of pay-
ments crisis. Such a crisis does, however, arise if a neg-
ative net lending position of the consolidated govern-
ment and private sector of an economy cannot be
financed by private capital imports for several years.
In Greece, this has been the case since 2007. 
To varying degrees, government budget as well as bal-
ance of payments crises have also arisen in Portugal,
Spain, Ireland and Italy, although the ingredients of
the crisis vary across these countries. For instance, in
stark contrast to Greece, in the early 2000s Spain and
Ireland had achieved remarkable improvements in
their public sector budgets, with government debt
ratios below the 60 percent eurozone threshold and on
downward trends, until they were hit by severe finan-
cial crises in 2008 (mostly caused by the bursting of a
speculative bubble in the real-estate market), with
subsequent government interventions turning their
budgets into large and unsustainable deficits.4
However, the 2007/2008 financial crisis was not equal-
ly disastrous for government budgets in all countries.
The Italian government debt ratio had been on a high
level for a long time, exceeding 120 percent as early as
the mid-1990s, followed by a moderate downward
correction, but remaining above the Greek level until
2006. The financial crisis had a very moderate impact
on the Italian government budget, although it did halt
the downward trend in 2008. Moreover, while Spain,
Portugal and Italy did see reductions in their private
sector net lending positions from the 1990s to the
2000s, these reductions were not nearly as strong as
that observed in Greece.5
Among all of these countries (subsequently referred
to as GIPS), only Greece now has a public sector
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which is undoubtedly insolvent. Yet, over the past
3 years, all of them have run into a balance of pay-
ments crisis in that large financing needs of the
domestic agents (private and or public) could no
longer be met by private capital imports. As pointed
out by Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011a and 2011b),
in the case of Ireland and Italy the crisis has partly
been one of capital flight. All GIPS countries are
members of the eurozone. How did the Eurosystem
respond to this multiple internal balance of payments
crisis? In the aforementioned papers, Hans-Werner
Sinn and Timo Wollmershäuser have shown that it
has responded through large and persistent cross-
country credit relationships accumulating under the
Target2 system.6 They argue that this constitutes a
dysfunctional use of the system, quite separate from
its intended purpose. In this paper, I want to evaluate
this crisis response against the backdrop of estab-
lished theory of balance of payments adjustment. A
principal insight will be that the accumulation of
Target2 balances may be seen as the GIPS countries
playing the role of reserve currency countries within a
fixed-rate-system of the Bretton Woods type.
Balance of payments crises with and without national
currencies
The public debate during the past couple of years has
largely focused on refinancing and restructuring the
outstanding stock of public debt in troubled countries
and the specter of write-downs in creditors’ asset
positions or, in the extreme case, disorderly default.
Admittedly, this aspect must not be ignored because
of possible systemic risks, but in the longer term the
true underlying problem is one of flows, i.e. of the
annual deficit in the government budget and the cur-
rent account. Restructurings, even debt reliefs, pro-
vide little lasting help as long as these flows are on
unsustainable paths. 
As regards the EU, two questions are of great impor-
tance. Firstly, will a return to their own currencies
help the deficit countries? And secondly, how did the
Eurosystem react to balance of payments crises of
the kind described? I shall deal primarily with the
second question here. However, a brief note on the
first question may be permitted. There is one lesson
that we should have learnt from history: nominal cur-
rency devaluations are helpful only in the short run,
if helpful at all. In the medium to long run they are
unlikely to help at all, leaving us with higher inflation
as the only lasting effect. This holds true, at least, if
the underlying problem is one of rigid real wages.
Furthermore, it is aggravated, if devaluations are
undertaken non-cooperatively by many countries. If,
on the other hand, nominal prices and wages are fully
flexible, then currency devaluations are unnecessary
in the first place, as the required adjustments are also
feasible without resorting to weakened national cur-
rencies. It is a great illusion that the plight of weak
economies can be resolved by letting them have weak
currencies. This is a recipe for them to remain weak.
In addition, it is unclear whether expenditure, partic-
ularly public expenditure, on domestic versus foreign
goods is sufficiently elastic with respect to relative
goods prices for devaluations to deliver the desired
short-run effect. These are all familiar arguments
that, in my view, should prevent us from viewing the
return to currency devaluations as a solution to the
present balance of payments crises, not to mention
the legal and practical problems connected with a
return of Greece or other euro countries to their own
currencies. 
The second question of how the present practice of
Eurosystem tends to respond to emerging balance of
payments crises has for a long time remained almost
completely ignored. It was not until several media
contributions by Hans-Werner Sinn and the two
papers by Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011a and
2011b) that this issue has started receiving broader
attention in the public and academic debate about the
European sovereign debt crisis. As we know by now,
the issue became relevant at the very beginning of the
balance of payments crisis in 2007, when the net lend-
ing positions of the private and public sectors in the
so-called GIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain) could no longer be matched by private
capital imports.
However, does it make sense at all to talk of a balance
of payments crisis in parts of a currency area? At least
the textbook case of a balance of payments crisis does
not seem applicable here, since balance of payments
theory typically refers to an entire currency area. The
implicit assumption, however, is that the currency
area coincides with a fiscal and political union – in
brief: a country. This, however, is not the case with the
eurozone where member countries were allowed, and
keen, to retain fiscal and political independence. This
is why all euro countries still compile their own
national balance of payments statistics. Moreover, as
6 Target stands for ‘Trans-European  Automated  Real-time  Gross
Settlement Express Transfer System’. The system was developed as a
multilateral clearing system for intra-European payments in connec-
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we shall see, national central banks within the euro-
zone continue to be important players in the current
balance of payments crises. Complaints about the
lack of a political union with a common fiscal policy
to support European Monetary Union are unhelpful
as long as striving for such a union is unrealistic. Nor
should we place much hope in fiscal rules in the form
of a reinforced Stability and Growth Pact. The upshot
is that, the particularity of a common currency
notwithstanding, we need to view the eurozone as a
group of countries with a fixed exchange rate system
in need of a well-functioning mechanism of member
countries’ balance of payments. The present crisis
reveals that such a mechanism is not in place.
Looking at the eurozone as a fixed-rate system
A fixed-rate currency system needs an adjustment
mechanism that corrects balance of payments dise-
quilibria without nominal exchange rate adjustments.
One could argue that the balance of payments of any
one eurozone country need not be in equilibrium vis-
à-vis the other member countries, but only vis-à-vis
the entire rest of the world. After all, exchange rate
adjustments are still possible vis-à-vis non-member
countries. However, this mechanism of adjustment is
not available simultaneously and independently to all
member countries, according to their diverging needs.
We are confronted with the oft-quoted question: does
one size fit all? The question is rhetorical, of course,
and in the present context it implies that eurozone
member countries still need a mechanism that aligns
their expenditure levels with balance of payments
constraints. Moreover, given the common currency,
this must be an adjustment mechanism akin to what
balance of payments theory envisages for a fixed-rate
system.
The ultimate purpose of a balance of payments
adjustment mechanism is to ensure that agents within
a given area observe their respective inter-temporal
budget constraints. If all agents are able to close gaps
between their current expenditures (including any
obligation from existing debt) and their incomes
through lending in private capital markets, then we
automatically observe a balance of payments equilib-
rium, no matter how this area is delineated.
Otherwise, there is a balance of payments disequilib-
rium and, if it persists, the spectre of a crisis. 
However, if this area is composed of several countries,
each with its own currency, then central banks enter
the picture. They can soften inter-temporal budget
constraints for other agents in their countries by buy-
ing or selling foreign exchange reserves. Indeed, in a
fixed-rate system central banks are typically obliged
to provide this type of relief. This, however, can be no
more than temporary relief. Hence the crucial ques-
tion is whether such central bank operations set off an
adjustment mechanism that leads agents back to their
intertemporal budget constraints. If this is not the
case, then the persistence of unsustainable financing
positions will eventually lead to crisis. This, in a nut-
shell, is what has happened in the Eurosystem through
the Target2 balances, as described by Sinn and
Wollmershäuser (2011a and 2011b).
The textbook mechanism of adjustment for a fixed-
rate currency system is a modern version of Hume’s
price specie flow mechanism. If the central bank of a
deficit country sells foreign exchange reserves, then its
monetary base (central bank money) shrinks. The
opposite occurs if the central bank of a surplus coun-
try accumulates foreign exchange reserves. The price
specie flow theory asserts that this combination of
monetary contraction and monetary expansion brings
about a change in relative prices that causes expendi-
ture switching in both countries. Provided that the
price elasticity of expenditure is sufficiently high, this
eventually restores balance of payments equilibrium.
This mechanism requires two pre-conditions: the exis-
tence of a reserve currency and price flexibility. For
the deficit country, price flexibility implies ‘internal
devaluation’, which ultimately means a painful reduc-
tion in wages. I shall return to this point below. As to
the reserve currency, a formal fixed-rate system typi-
cally features a specific currency that serves this pur-
pose; in the Bretton Woods system it was the US dol-
lar, in the gold standard it was gold. Importantly, in a
fixed-rate system of the Bretton Woods type (BW-
type) system there is a basic asymmetry. The reserve
currency country has the exclusive privilege of financ-
ing its balance of payments deficit by printing money,
provided only the other countries accept a build-up of
their foreign exchange reserves.7 Let us note that
7 This does not mean, of course, that the other countries can only
accumulate foreign exchange reserves to the extent to which the
reserve currency country has a current account deficit. In fact, the
US current account showed surpluses during a good part of the BW
System. Exceptions were 1953 (War in Korea) and 1959 as well as
after 1971. It does mean, however, that the reserve currency country
can exchange its bonds with low interest rates, or even its cash, for
assets in other currencies with relatively high interest rates.
Therefore, the reserve currency country has the privilege of achiev-
ing seigniorage comparable to that of a central bank. In 1960, this
led the then French president to the meanwhile proverbial statement
that the United States as the reserve currency country of the Bretton
Woods System had enjoyed an ‘exorbitant privilege’– see
Eichengreen (2007 and 2011).CESifo Forum 2012 17
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although this asymmetry was initially an intended ele-
ment of the BW System, it led to its collapse in 1973,
as the other countries were no longer willing to accept
the degree of inflation that would arise in the entire
fixed exchange rate system as a result of the US using
its printing press to finance its excess of expenditure
over income. Interestingly, the United States did not
lose its reserve currency status after 1973, but this was
no longer based on a formal agreement; see
Eichengreen (2011).
The history of Bretton Woods thus illustrates that a
fixed-rate system where a certain country has the
privilege of printing the reserve currency is likely,
sooner or later, to create tension between member
countries.8 If the reserve currency country runs up a
balance of payments deficit, it can simply print fresh
money which, through exchange market interven-
tions, will be converted into national currency by the
central banks of surplus countries. It thus becomes
part of foreign exchange reserves in these countries’
central banks. If the surplus countries want to avoid
the risk of inflation, they can do so, up to a point at
least, by sterilization. This means reducing the
domestic component (domestic lending) of their
monetary base. To the extent that this type of stabi-
lization occurs, the reserve currency expansion does
not inflate the money supply of the entire system.
However, in this case it seems questionable, whether
the price specie flow mechanism would ever become
effective, since there is no monetary expansion in
surplus countries. I shall return to this point below.
Independently of the price adjustment, however, this
mechanism implies ‘forced’ capital exports from the
surplus countries to the deficit country that holds
reserve currency status.
The Eurosystem’s adjustment mechanism: Target2
balances
How did the Eurosystem react to the present balance
of payments crises? In the Eurosystem countries no
longer have their own currencies, and there is no
national reserve currency within the Eurosystem. Is
there, nevertheless, a well-functioning balance.-of-
payments adjustment mechanism? 
The Target2 balances within the Eurosystem, as
described by Hans-Werner Sinn and Timo Wollmers  -
häuser (2011a and 2011b), reveal a surprising and
worrisome finding. Starting in 2007, the Eurosystem
has reacted to balance of payments crises by de facto
letting the troubled deficit countries play a role that in
a BW-type fixed-rate system would be the privilege of
the country with the reserve currency. However, in
contrast to the price-specie-flow-type mechanism of
the BW System, there is no correction mechanism
here: the unsustainable flows underlying the balance
of payments crisis (public budget, current account)
remain virtually unaffected. Furthermore, in sharp
contrast to the BW System, the surplus countries
shoulder a substantial risk by accumulating ‘foreign
exchange reserves’ that are threatened by insolvency
of the public sector in deficit countries. We must thus
conclude that, instead of a well-functioning adjust-
ment mechanism, the Eurosystem has adopted an
automatism of sharing risk emanating from unsus-
tainable debt accumulation.
What is the logic underlying this verdict? As we have
seen above, the reserve currency country in a BW-type
fixed-rate system can simply finance a balance of pay-
ments deficit by printing fresh money that will then
become the foreign exchange reserve, and thus part of
the monetary base, in the central banks of surplus
countries. To put it bluntly: an importer in the reserve
country pays his bill with newly created central bank
money, while the supplier in the surplus country
receives his own country’s central bank money from
his central bank, with the additional reserve currency
ending up in the foreign component of the surplus
country’s monetary base. Creation of central bank
money is always based on lending by the central bank.
In this case the importer becomes a debtor to the cen-
tral bank of the deficit (reserve) country, and the cen-
tral bank of the surplus country becomes a creditor to
the deficit country. The key aspect of this process is
that money created by the central bank of the surplus
country has its origin in lending by the central bank of
the deficit country. 
In any currency union with ‘regional’ central banks,
we would not expect the entire stock of central bank
money circulating within any one region to have orig-
inated in lending by the ‘domestic’ central bank.
Looked at on a very general level, the Target2 system
was meant to serve as a ‘plumbing system’ that facili-
tates such cross border flows of central bank money.9
Taking stock at any point in time, we would not be
8 The European monetary system has tried to avoid this asymmetry
by abstaining from any notion of a single reserve currency. Instead,
exchange market interventions were supposed to take place symmet-
rically by deficit and surplus countries.
9 The Deutsche Bundesbank describes this as follows: “[…] Target2-
(net)balances are […] the result of the cross-border distribution of
central bank money within the decentralized structure of the
Eurosystem” (Deutsche Bundesbank 2011).CESifo Forum 2012 18
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surprised to see positive Target2 balances, represent-
ing central bank money stocks circulating in one area
that goes back to original central bank lending in
some other region. However, we would expect such
balances to be relatively small fractions of a region’s
monetary base, and to follow no systematic trend over
time. This is, indeed, what we have witnessed up to
2007. We would, however, be much surprised to see
Target2 balances of any one country (or a small group
of countries), exploding over time. Yet, this is exactly
what Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011a and 2011b)
have shown has happened from 2007 up to the present
date. The numbers are astounding. Until 2007 the
Target2 liabilities of the GIPS countries at the central
banks of the surplus countries within the Eurosystem
were largely in the single-digit billion range; since
2007, however, they have increased rapidly to account
for over 300 billion euros by the end of 2010. By
September 2011, the Deutsche Bundesbank had accu-
mulated a Target2 balance totaling 450 billion euros.
A comprehensive presentation of the empirical devel-
opments, as well as a detailed description of the
mechanics of Target2, is found in Sinn and Wollmers  -
häuser (2011a).10
The analogy to the reserve currency mechanism in a
BW-type system is quite striking. In the recent explo-
sion of Target2 balances, the central banks of deficit
countries have financed domestic agents’ (say their
governments’) expenditure by creating euro central
bank money, which then became central bank money
of the surplus countries via the Target2 system. In
other words, newly granted GIPS credits (or GIPS
bonds) have flown into the foreign component of the
monetary base in surplus countries. In this mecha-
nism, although the deficit country does not issue its
own currency, it is still true that central bank money
is created in that country which – exactly as in the
above-mentioned case of the reserve currency coun-
try – speedily becomes central bank money in the
surplus country. In parallel, the Target2 system
moves the claim of the central bank of the deficit
country to a claim of the surplus country.11 The cen-
tral aspect in both cases, the reserve currency mech-
anism of a BW-type system as well as the Target2
mechanism, is the cross-regional flow of central
bank money, and not whether or not different cur-
rencies are involved. 
Interestingly, the calculations by Sinn and
Wollmershäuser (2011a) show that up to this point the
Target2 balances have not resulted in an overly large
expansion of the central bank money supply within
the eurozone. In other words, the surplus countries
seemingly have sterilized their accumulation of ‘GIPS
foreign exchange reserves’, as surplus countries wor-
rying about inflation in a BW-type fixed-rate system
would typically do. As a result, a rapidly growing
share of the entire euro monetary base, which is not
based on gold and ‘true’ foreign exchange reserves,12
can be traced to creation of central bank money with-
in the GIPS countries for the purpose of financing
their balance of payments deficits. More specifically,
the monetary base of the non-GIPS countries created
via the ‘reserve currency status’ of the GIPS countries
meanwhile amounts to 64 percent (314 billion euros)
of the entire credit-financed monetary base (493 bil-
lion euros). No less than 66 percent of the credit-
financed money stock in the eurozone was created in
the GIPS countries, although their share in the GDP
of the Eurosystem amounts to only 18 percent.
There has been some controversy over the appropriate
interpretation of Target2 balances. Specifically, it has
been argued that they should not be seen as financing
of GIPS countries’ expenditure on the grounds that in
some cases they seem related more to capital flight
than to current account deficits. As pointed out by
Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011a and 2011b), this was
the case in Ireland and Italy. However, this does not,
per se, make Target2 financing any less worrisome.
What matters is a good match between the maturity of
financing and the pattern of expenditure, particularly
regarding investment and consumption expenditure in
the public sector. It seems a safe bet to say that
Target2 balances have not improved the quality of
this match. Moreover, Target2 credit should not be
seen as the reason why unsustainable borrowing posi-
tions (of governments of private agents) arose in the
first place; see my introductory remarks above. The
issue here is not causality, but the finding that Target2
financing is almost the opposite of a well-functioning
adjustment mechanism in that it is a means to perpet-
uate such positions and to facilitate procrastination of
necessary adjustments.
How long can this go on?
Like all sterilization, the practice of sterilizing the
accumulation of the ‘Target2 GIPS reserves’ will
10 This paper also contains an extensive description of the debate
on Target2 balances in the media; on more recent developments,
see Hans-Werner Sinn, “Italy’s Capital Flight”, Project Syndicate,
2011-10-25.
11 This is done by debiting an account of the central bank of the
deficit country at the ECB and crediting an account of the central
bank of the surplus country at the ECB.  12 In this context ‘true’ means simply non-euro assets of the ECB.CESifo Forum 2012 19
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come to an end at some point. This point will be
reached once the entire monetary base within the sur-
plus countries of the Eurosystem is based on gold,
‘true’ foreign exchange reserves and Target2 claims.
At this point, further financing of GIPS countries’
balance of payments deficits through a build-up of
further Target2 balances will result in an expansion of
the monetary base of the Eurosystem, unless the cen-
tral banks of the core start selling their gold and for-
eign exchange reserves or borrow on a large scale from
their banking systems. In the June 2011 version of
their working paper, Sinn and Wollmershäuser had
come to the conclusion that the point of exhaustion
of the refinancing credit would be reached by 2013,
but in the November NBER-version of their working
paper they show that, mainly because of capital flight
from Italy, that point has meanwhile already been sur-
passed: the Bundesbank has now become a net bor-
rower of the German banking system. 
A striking parallel can also be observed at the begin-
ning of the present Target2 practice. In a colossal fail-
ure of financial markets, the risk premia on public
debt of troubled countries that were observed in the
1990s disappeared almost overnight when the
Eurosystem was introduced in 1999. There are two
possible interpretations. One is that investors were
under the illusion that the loss of an autonomous
national monetary policy would immediately restore
full fiscal discipline. The other, more convincing
explanation is that from the start investors were treat-
ing the explicit no-bailout commitment as incredible.
The result was an unprecedented ease of financing for
government deficit in some of the weaker member
countries of the eurozone, and a corresponding resur-
gence of borrowing. However, in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis of 2007/08 the implicit bail-out
commitment had apparently lost its credibility too,
whence risk premia started to return. Unsurprisingly,
at least with hindsight, it was around this time that the
Target2 system started being used in the way
described above; see again Sinn and Wollmershäuser
(2011). With private funds drying up or being avail-
able only at almost prohibitive risk premia, govern-
ments were keen on alternative financing and the
Target2 system, although never designed for this pur-
pose, was made available to help. Instead of correct-
ing the underlying flows, troubled countries were hap-
pily adopting an ‘as-if reserve currency status’. It is a
little ironic that, at least if judged by the evolution of
yield spreads, the bail-out commitment did not
become fully credible even after it had been made
explicit through the country-specific rescue packages
and the rescue facility (EFSF) in 2010. 
Target2 balances: financing without adjustment 
In principle, the above mentioned asymmetry in the
monetary base can continue ad infinitum, as the mon-
etary base is a stock variable. Moreover, even an in  -
crease in this asymmetry need not be inflationary,
provided the total money supply does not increase rel-
ative to output. However, what will come to an end
eventually is the sterilized expansion of Target2 bal-
ances. If the ECB is unwilling to run down its foreign
exchange reserves, the end will be reached by 2013.
However, once the practice starts being inflationary,
we must expect the sort of international tension with-
in the eurozone that has led to the collapse of the
Bretton Woods System in the 1970s.
If Target2 financing thus lacks long run viability, the
crucial question is whether it involves sufficient, or
any, adjustment in the short and medium run to avoid
crisis by the time the accounting identities strike. The
tragedy with Target2 financing is that there is very lit-
tle, if any, of the adjustment mechanism that we
would normally expect from a price-specie-flow
mechanism. On the contrary, the roots of the problem
remain untouched by the Target2 balances. This is not
to say that no adjustment takes place, but I see no ele-
ment of corrective adjustment inherent in Target2
financing as such.
Firstly, as I have emphasized above, a key element of
a price-specie-flow-type mechanism, i.e. monetary
expansion in the surplus countries, has not taken
place to date, due to sterilization. Monetary expan-
sion, a vehicle for nominal price changes that might
then lead to a mechanism of expenditure switching, is
lacking. Those afraid of a surge in inflation will say
that this is for good reason. However, the mechanism
would bear fruit only if and when the surplus coun-
tries were to accept an expansion of the money supply
and the ensuing inflationary rise in prices. Let us note,
however, that what we would need according to this
mechanism is a change in relative prices that could
help to eliminate the flow disequilibrium (current
account deficit, government budget deficit). More
specifically, the classic adjustment process in this case
requires a real appreciation in surplus countries,
meaning an increase in the prices of their tradable
goods relative to those of deficit countries, as well as
a reduction (increase) of the prices of tradable goodsCESifo Forum 2012 20
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relative to non-tradable goods in surplus countries
(deficit countries). The attendant expenditure switch-
ing effect on the flow demand of goods would tend to
correct the balance of payments imbalance. Demand
for goods (tradable and non-tradable) from the deficit
countries would rise, while demand for the goods
from the surplus countries would fall. This would be
reinforced by mirror-image supply effects, i.e. a real
allocation of resources towards non-tradable (trad-
able) goods in surplus (deficit) countries.13
The contribution of this type of adjustment to solving
the balance of payments problem depends, of course,
on the price elasticities of demand and supply. They
must be high enough to let absorption in deficit coun-
tries rise less (fall more) than domestic output; and
vice versa in the surplus countries. If supply is inelas-
tic, there is good reason to believe that restoring exter-
nal equilibrium would come at the expense of internal
equilibrium, so that deficit countries would experi-
ence an increase in unemployment; see Corden (1994).
Whatever the details, unless there are huge produc-
tivity increases, a true correction of the disequilibri-
um underlying the balance of payments problem will
be accompanied by a decline (increase) of real
income in deficit (surplus) countries. Naturally, with
monetary expansion in the surplus countries, this
might be easier to digest for deficit countries in an
inflationary environment, since it would then be pos-
sible without ‘internal devaluation’ in the deficit
countries, meaning a fall in nominal incomes. But as
pointed out before, monetary expansion from
Target2 financing as such has so far been avoided. If
worried about the risk of inflation, we might add that
this was for good reasons. However, at the same time
it deprives the whole process of the price-specie-flow
mechanism of adjustment. Hence, merely observing
that Target2 financing has not been inflationary to
date provides little comfort.
It is all too obvious that a workable solution requires
permanent changes in the annual government budgets
to generate primary surpluses that bring down debt
ratios to sustainable levels. If national governments
and the EU rescue packages fail to achieve this, and if
the Target2 financing continues, then the euro risks a
Krugmanite currency crisis, as I shall detail below.
What determines the likelihood of successful and fis-
cal adjustment? As is well known, the required auster-
ity pain depends significantly on growth prospects. In
the calculus of austerity, each percentage point of
additional real growth (or lower contraction) has the
same effect as a 1 percentage point reduction in the
real interest rate. Even under optimistic growth
assumptions, the required austerity in GIPS countries
is huge; see Darvas et al. (2011). This brings us to the
uneasy question of whether too much fiscal austerity
may hamper real growth, thus causing a vicious circle
that makes adjustment even more difficult and
painful. Work by Alberto Alesina and others has
shown that fiscal consolidation has in many cases
contributed to, rather than impeded, real growth. This
was true particularly, in cases where consolidation
was based on a political consensus and was carried
out on the expenditure side of the budget. However, it
is highly questionable whether the prerequisites for
expansionary austerity are prevailing in the GIPS
countries; see Perotti (2011). 
Expectations: does the euro face a speculative attack?
The expansionary effect of fiscal consolidation, as
well as supply-side reforms in GIPS countries, will not
be felt until the longer term. In the short run, their
effect is mostly driven by expectations. If such reforms
are deemed credible and promising at the time of
implementation, the immediate effect will be a lower-
ing of risk premia on government debt, which will
ease adjustment. Thus, the success of reform feeds on
credibility. Unfortunately, this may generate multiple
equilibrium outcomes, particularly regarding govern-
ment default. If a rescue and reform program is
deemed credible by investors, then the low interest
that the government has to pay on its debt reduces the
incentive for and thus the probability of default or a
restructuring of existing debt. If the same program
gets implemented, but fails to convince the markets,
then the outcome might be a need to restructure debt,
or even default; see de Grauwe (2011) and Grossman
(2011). Such indeterminacy is not inevitable, however.
Conceivably, offering a rescue facility could be a deci-
sive factor for triggering a ‘good equilibrium’ scenario
without any sovereign default, instead of a possible
‘bad equilibrium’ scenario with default. 
Expectations and credibility play an important role
not just for investors and financial markets, but vis-à-
vis the domestic private sector more generally. It will,
for instance, be vital for GIPS countries to attract
investment and to avoid the emigration of skilled
labor. Moreover, comprehensive reform will almost by
13 Note that these changes in relative prices do not require flexible
exchange rates and are also conceivable in a monetary union; see
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necessity involve several stages of implementation. It
is well known that under these circumstances reform
might be plagued by time inconsistency. More specif-
ically, if private agents anticipate that the government
might ex post have an incentive to renege on reform
and turn to default, then they will take this into
account in their current decisions (consumption,
investment, wage setting etc.) and thereby generate
conditions that increase the incentive for default in
the future. Certain reform policies may simply be
impossible to announce in a credible way. Here, too,
rescue measures might conceivably provide help in
serving as a ‘commitment device’ for a government
with weak credibility of its own. 
A final point in this context leads me back to Target2
balances. Target2 financing perpetuates conditions
that cannot continue forever. Ruling out large scale
borrowing of the core countries’ central banks from
their commercial banks, a situation may soon arise in
which the ECB must decide between two unattractive
options: permitting monetary expansion through non-
sterilized continuation of Target2 financing, or a
reduction of the international reserves of the
Eurosystem. If government budgets should remain
unreformed, there is no third alternative.14 Let us use
T to denote the point in time when the ECB unavoid-
ably faces this decision. Moreover, let us assume that
the ECB will not be willing to touch its foreign
exchange reserves. Then, other things equal, a process
of devaluation of the euro will set in. This is just the
mirror image of a stronger monetary expansion in the
euro area. It is improbable, however, that forward
looking investors would let this point in time
approach without guarding themselves against sud-
den devaluation. Instead, what we should expect in
this – admittedly – worst-case scenario is a classic
euro currency crisis to arise well before time T. The
reasoning behind this statement is as follows.
I simplify by assuming risk neutrality and by focusing
on the euro-dollar relationship. In a world with for-
ward-looking expectations and high international
capital mobility, capital markets are governed by the
uncovered interest parity. This implies that at time T
there needs to be a risk premium on euro assets that
offsets the expected depreciation. There will be a dis-
crete jump in euro interest rates, as well as a discrete
jump in the euro value of the dollar. However, with
forward-looking expectations, a discrete jump in the
exchange rate that is anticipated by rational investors
is not an equilibrium time path. Rational investors
will not knowingly and willingly wait for time T and
then watch their euro investments suddenly lose dollar
value. Instead, they will try to avoid this by betting
against the euro well before time T arrives. In doing
so, they effectively bring forward the time when the
euro starts to depreciate. 
This is a relatively straightforward application of the
first generation model of currency crises developed by
Krugman (1979).15 In that model a speculative attack
occurs after the central bank has embarked on a path
of financing recurring budget deficits through mone-
tary expansion. Defending the exchange rate requires
running down foreign exchange reserves, which can-
not go on forever. Speculation will set in before the
policy would have depleted all foreign exchange
reserves, thus bringing forward in time the point when
the fixed-rate system breaks down. In our case, point
T is not the time when foreign exchange reserves
would in fact be depleted, but the point at which the
ECB is confronted with the decision of whether it
wants to embark on a process of losing foreign ex  -
change reserves for the sake of price stability.
Currency speculation might bring forward in time
that awkward policy choice, and force the central
bank to accept inflation and depreciation earlier.
It is more likely, however, that developments will
play out in a different way, analogous to the collapse
of a BW-type fixed-rate system. In such a system,
central banks of surplus countries risk negative
wealth shocks through depreciation of their foreign
currency reserves, should the system break down. In
a sense, that is the price for having chosen the
‘wrong’ reserve currency. The Chinese central bank,
with its huge dollar reserves, is currently facing the
same risk. With the Target2 balances in the balance
sheet of the Bundesbank, an analogous risk exists
from a partial or complete write-down of credits or
bonds threatened by insolvency of the public sector
(or also of private debtors) GIPS countries.
However, within the Eurosystem this risk is shared
by all member countries in line with their ECB capi-
tal shares. Arguably, just as its huge dollar reserves
constitute an incentive for China to avoid a devalua-
tion of the US dollar, so the Target2 balances may
14 Ruling out central bank borrowing from commercial banks, Sinn
and Wollmershäuser (2011a) have calculated this point to be reached
by 2013, given an unchanged continuation of past developments.
However, as they document in Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011b) the
Bundesbank has in fact turned to large-scale borrowing from the
German banking system, thus postponing the point in time when a
decision has to be made between selling foreign exchange reserves or
allowing Target2 financing to be inflationary.
15 A convenient exposition of this model is found in Obstfeld and
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constitute an incentive for the ECB to indulge in
procrastination in order to avoid or postpone sce-
narios that lead to write-downs on GIPS assets pre-
sent in the non-GIPS monetary base.
Conclusions
How is all of this to be assessed from a monetary pol-
icy perspective? In a well-functioning fixed exchange
rate system the reserve currency country enjoys its
privilege based on trustworthiness. Ideally, the choice
of a reserve currency is a basic, deliberate and con-
sensual monetary policy decision, made when design-
ing the currency system. Similarly, in the absence of a
formal fixed-rate system, certain currencies may be
granted de facto reserve currency status, based on a
mixture of economic and political strengths of their
countries, as with the US dollar after the break down
of the Bretton Woods system, and indeed with the
euro in more recent times.16
In stark contrast, there is no deliberate monetary pol-
icy decision behind the role that Target2 balances
have been playing in the Eurosystem’s response to the
balance of payments crises that arose after 2007 in
the GIPS countries. This role has almost nothing to
do with the ‘plumbing role’ that it was designed for
with respect to distributing central bank money
across member states. Instead, it came about mainly
as a response to fiscal needs, without being subject to
institutions and responsibilities pertaining to fiscal
policy. Even if the system does not collapse, this con-
tradicts the principles of sound monetary policy.
There is also, of course, no special trustworthiness
involved in this case of ‘quasi reserve currency sta-
tus’. On top of all the reforms required by GIPS
countries retain sustainable fiscal positions, the mon-
etary policy institutions of the Eurosystem need a
reform that prevents the Target2 system from being
used to address fiscal needs.
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